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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Saint Alphonsus does not contest the nature of the case as described by Respondents-
Appellants (hereinafter "County"). 
B. Statement of Facts 
Saint Alphonsus does not contest most of the Statement of Facts as described by the 
County. However, Saint Alphonsus disputes and objects to the characterization of the 
Application being filed "thirty-two (32)" days after the date the Patient was admitted to 
hospital; it was filed thirty-one days after Patient's admission into the hospital. Saint Alphonsus 
also objects and disputes the claim that IDHW denied the Application as untimely for it did not; 
rather, the reason stated vvas as follows: "REASON: Does not meet Medical Eligibility 
requirements." (Agency Record, Ex. l (hereinafter "Ag. R. Ex. l .") at 28.) 
C. Course of Proceedings 
Saint Alphonsus does not contest most of the Course of Proceedings as set forth by the 
County. However, it objects to the inclusion of the County's findings and determinations, which 
have already been determined to be in error by the District Court. The at-issue Application was 
timely filed and this Court should uphold the District Court's findings and enter an order 
remanding the matter so that the County may conduct its mandatory investigation of the 
Application. 
II. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the Application was timely filed under the Medical Indigency Act. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIE'W 
Saint Alphonsus has no objection to the standard of review set forth by the County. 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
The sole issue on appeal is how acts provided within Title 31, Chapter 35, Idaho Code 
("Medical Indigency Act" or "the Code") are to be computed. Saint Alphonsus properly 
followed Idaho Code § 31-3 505(3) when it filed the Application. The Application was timely 
filed under Idaho statute, and Idaho Supreme Court precedent, both of which demonstrate how 
acts provided by law under the Code are to be computed. See Idaho Code § 73-109; IHC 
Hospitals, Inc. v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 188, 75 P.3d 1198, n. 2 (2003); St. Alphonsus Reg'l 
Jiled'l Ctr., Ltd v. Canyon County, 120 Idaho 420, 816 P.2d 977 (1991). It is also timely filed 
based upon Idaho Supreme Court precedent construing how other acts outside the Code, but still 
provided by law are to be computed. See Afitchell v. Bingham Afernorial Hospital, 130 Idaho 
420, 422-26, 942 P.2d 544, 546-550 (1997); Harris v. Beco Corp., 110 Idaho 28, 29-30, 713 P.2d 
1387, 1388-89 (1986); Cather v. Kelso, 103 Idaho 685, 688, 652 P.2d 188, 192 (1982); Oliason 
v. Girard, 57 Idaho 41, 61 P.2d 288, 289-90 (1936). based upon statute and case law, 
Saint Alphonsus has demonstrated that its position is correct. In contrast, Saint Alphonsus 
submits that the County has failed to supports its contention with any applicable or controlling 
authority. Specifically, the County has cited to no authority as to how the acts provided within 
Code are to be computed. (See Appellants' Brief, § IV.B.) This fact was pointed out at the 
appeal hearing before the Board but the County did not remedy this deficiency at that time. 
( Agency Transcript, 2, p. 16:15-21.) It failed to do so on appeal to the District Court. (See 
generally District Ct. Transcript.) The County did not then attempt to address the Idaho 
Supreme Court precedent discussing the calculation of deadlines under the Code. It still has not 
so even on its own appeal. All that the County has submitted to this Court is argument with 
no legal support as to how it believes Idaho Code § 31-3505(3) sh,mld be computed, vvhich is 
insufficient to support its position on appeal. See, e.g., US Bank 'n v. Kuenzli, 134 
Idaho 222, 999 P.2d 877 (2000)("Where a party raises an issue on appeal but fails to support the 
alleged error with argument and authoritv, the party is deemed to have waived the issue.") 
Accordingly, given that the County's position has no legal basis and is in fact contrary to Idaho 
statute, Idaho precedent construing the Code, and Idaho precedent construing other acts provided 
by law, the Court should uphold the District Court's determination reversing the Board's 
decision and remand it to the County for further proceedings. 
A. The Application was Timely Filed Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 31-3505(3). 
The Board failed to follow the plain language of Idaho Code § 31-3505(3) when it denied 
the Application as untimely. \Vhen determining the meaning of a statute, a court must determine 
and give effect to legislative intent. Idaho Cardiology Ass 'n., P.A. v. Idaho Physicians Network, 
Inc., 141 Idaho 223,227, 108 P.3d 370, 374 (2005). When construing a statute, the Court "will 
not deal in any subtle refinements of the legislation, but will ascertain and give effect to the 
purpose and intent of the legislature, based on the whole act and every word therein, lending 
substance and meaning to the provisions." Ada County Assessor v. Roman Catholic Diocese of 
Boise, 123 Idaho 425, 428, 849 P.2d 98, 101 (1993). Because "the best guide to legislative intent 
is the words of the statute itselC' the interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words 
of the statute. In re Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819, 824, 828 P.2d 848, 853 (1992). The 
plain meaning of a statute therefore will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is 
contrary. St. Luke's Reg'! lvfed'l Ctr., Ltd v. Bd of Comm 'rs of Ada County, 146 Idaho 753, 755, 
203 P.3d 683, 686 (2009). 
Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, statutory construction is unnecessary and 
courts are free to apply the plain meaning; the Court does not construe it but simply follows the 
law as vvTitten and need only detem:ine the application of the words to the facts of the case at 
hand. Porter v. Board of Trustees, Preston School District No. 201, 141 Idaho 11, 14, 105 P.3d 
3 
671,674 (2004); kfartin v. State Farm Afat. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244,246, 61 P.3d 601, 603 
(2002). Where, however, the language of the statute is capable of more than one reasonable 
construction it is ambiguous. Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 142 Idaho 804, 
807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 (2006). "When a statute is ambiguous, the determination of the meaning 
of the statute and its application is also a matter of law over which this Court exercises free 
review." St. Luke's Reg'! A1ed'l Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd of Comm 'rs of Ada County, 146 Idaho 753, 755, 
203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009). "If it is necessary for this Court to interpret a statute, the Court will 
attempt to ascertain legislative intent, and in construing a statute, may examine the language 
used, the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, and the policy behind the statute." Id. 
(citing Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Insur. Fund, 13 Idaho 130, 134, 997 P.2d 591, 595 (2000).) 
"To ascertain legislative intent, the Court examines not only the literal words of the statute, but 
the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the policy behind the statute, and its 
legislative history." Id. (citing Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch Dist. No. 84, 142 Idaho 804, 
807, 134 P.3d 655,658 (2006).) 
In the present matter, the statute is unambiguous. Idaho Code § 31-3505 governs the 
time and manner for filing applications for financial assistance. There are five types. The first 
type of application is for non-emergent necessary medical services. Idaho Code§ 31-3505(1). 
The second type of application is for emergent necessary medical services. Idaho Code § 31-
3505(2). The third type of application is for emergent necessary medical services that require 
hospitalization. Idaho Code § 31-3505(3). The fourth type of application is for requests for 
additional treatment. Idaho Code § 31-3505( 4). The fifth type of application is for delayed 
applications. Idaho Code§ 31-3505(5). 
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As noted above, the patient was hospitalized on July 27, 2013 for a level 1 motor vehicle 
trauma. (Ag. R. Ex. l. at 2, 14.) Accordingly, the present matter involves the third type of 
application, which is for emergent necessary medical services that require hospitalization. Idaho 
Code§ 31-3505(3) provides as follovvs: 
(Id.) 
(3) In the case of hospitalization, a completed application for emergency 
necessary medical services shall be filed with the department any time within 
thirty-one (31) days of the date of admission. 
Section 3505(3) does not specify how to compute the time to file an application. 
However, Title 73, Chapter 1, Idaho Code which concerns general code provisions and the 
construction of statutes, addresses the computation of time for acts contemplated by a statute: 
COMPUTATION OF TIME. The time in which any act provided by law is to be 
done is computed by excluding the first day, and including the last unless the last 
is a holiday and then it is also excluded. 
Idaho Code § 73-109. Accordingly, the date of hospitalization is excluded in the computation, 
which results in July 28, 2013 being the "first day" that should have been counted pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 73-109. This makes the thirty-one day deadline August 27, 2013, which is the date 
the Application was filed. The Patient's application was therefore timely filed under the Code, 
specifically, Idaho Code § 31-3505(3). 
B. The Board's Interpretation is Contrary to Existing Idaho Supreme Court 
Precedent that Computes when Acts are to be Done under the Code. 
The County does not cite to fillY case law to support its contention that the plain meaning 
ofldaho Code § 31-3 505(3) means that "the date of admission would be considered day one (1) 
and thirty-one (31) days would be counted from that date." (See Appellant's Brief, p. 9.) To 
make this argument, the County states that "[t]he language "-within thirty-one (31) days of the 
date of admission" clearly indicates that the clock begins to run on the date of admission to the 
5 
hospital." (Id. pp. 8-9 .)( emphasis in original.) Idaho courts have already construed and 
computed the deadlines for acts of law within the Code and these decisions demonstrate that the 
County's position is simply wrong. 
While the County cites to IHC Hospitals, Inc. v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 188, 75 P.3d 
1198 (2003) for an irrelevant proposition in a later portion of the Brief, the County does not 
mention that IHC actually addresses how acts specified in the Code are to be computed. (See 
Appellant's Brief, p. 17.) Specifically, in footnote 2, the Idaho Supreme Court notes when an 
appeal would be due from an initial determination. At that time, Idaho Code § 31-3505D read as 
follows: 
3 l-3505D. APPEAL OF INITIAL DETERl\1HNATION. An applicant or provider 
may appeal an adverse initial determination of the board by filing a vvritten notice 
of appeal with the board within twentv-eight (28) davs of the date of the initial 
determination. If no appeal is filed within the time allowed, the determination of 
the board shall become final. 
(1996 Idaho Laws Ch. 410 (S.B. 1567), Health Care for the Medically Indigent-General 
Amendments)( emphasis added). It nov; reads as follows: 
31-3505D. APPEAL OF INITIAL DETERi\HNATION DENYING AN 
APPLICATION. An applicant, provider or third party applicant may appeal an 
initial determination of the county commissioners denying an application by filing 
a written notice of appeal with the county commissioners within twentv-eight (28) 
days of the date of the denial. If no appeal is filed within the time allowed, the 
initial determination of the county commissioners denying an application shall 
become final. 
(Id.)( emphasis added). Under either version, the language of section 3 505D is basically the same 
as that found within section 3505(3)1. See, e.g. "within thirty-one (31) days of the date of 
admission." This Court noted that the denial was December 11, 2000 and that the initial 
1 While not at issue on this appeal, Saint Alphonsus would note that Idaho Code § 31-
3505(2) also employs the same basic language that identifies a starting date followed by a 
deadline to act: "within thirty-one (31) days beginning with the first day of the provision of 
necessary medical services." 
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determination became final on January 8, 2011. IHC, 139 Idaho at 192, 75 P.3d at 1202 at n. 2. 
looking at Exhibits N and 0, which are copies of the calendar from December 2000 and 
January 2001, they clearly show that this Court did not include the date of the denial as the 
starting point. (Ag. R. Ex. 1 at 86, 87.) In other words, this Court interpreted the Code in the 
same manner as Petitioner has done to demonstrate that the Application was timely filed. 
This Court employed the same computation methodology in St. Alphonsus Reg'! Afed'l 
Ctr., Ltd v. Canyon County, 120 Idaho 420, 816 P.2d 977 (1991) abrogated on other grounds by 
Univ. of Utah Hosp. v. Twin Falls County, 122 Idaho 1010, 842 P.2d 689 (1992). While the case 
was later abrogated, there is no indication that the Idaho Supreme Court's discussion regarding 
the methodology for computing a deadline under the Code was overturned. In that case, the 
patient becai11e medically indigent on August 24, 1987. Id. at 424, 816 P.2d at 981. Then Idaho 
Code § 31-3504 required an application for medical assistance to be filed within thirty days of 
when the patient "becomes medically indigent." Id. The Idaho Supreme Court determined that 
thirty days from August 24, 1987 was September 23, 1987. Again, this Court interpreted the 
Code in the same manner as Petitioner has done, which is to exclude the first day. 
Finally, at the hearing in front of the District Court, the County cited to Univ. of Utah 
Hosp. v. Pence, 104 Idaho 172, 657 P.2d 469 (1983) to discuss the change in limitation time for 
filing applications from one year to forty-five days. (District Ct. Transcript p. 10:6-10.) While 
the County does not cite to Pence on appeal, this is presumably because it too does not support 
County's position on appeal. In Pence, the Court had to determine whether the 1974 or 1976 
version of Idaho Code§ 31-3504 applied. Under the 1974 version, an application for county 
assistance could be made 
timely. Hm,:vever, the 1976 
one year of discharge, which would have made the application 
required applications for county assistance to be filed within 
7 
forty-five days: "An application for or on behalf of a medically indigent person rece1vmg 
emergency medical services may be made any time within forty-five ( 45) days following the 
admission of said person to the hospital furnishing said care." Id. at 174, 657 P.2d at 471. The 
Court determined that even though the medical services were provided prior to enactment of the 
1976 version, the hospital had fair notice of the law's new requirements when it went in effect 
after July 1, 1976. Accordingly, the Court "conclude[ d] that the proper measure of the time 
limitation period begins to run from July 1, 1976, the effective date of the 1976 version ofidaho 
Code§ 31-3504. This means that the forty-five day period would have run August 15, 1977, 
approximately three months before the appellant's application." Id. at 176, 657 P .2d at 4 73. In 
making this determination, the Court again excluded the first day in computing forty-five days, 
which is contrary to County's position on appeal. 
Idaho precedent construing the Code's deadlines does not support Gooding County's 
position in any manner. Accordingly, under section 3505(3)2, the day of admission to the 
hospital would be excluded in the computation, and the deadline to 
and was August 27, 2013. For these reasons as well, the Court 
an application would be 
that the Application 
was timely filed and that the decision to deny the Application was ,.vrnng as a matter of law. 
C. The Board's Interpretation is Contrary to Existing Idaho Supreme Court 
Precedent that Computes when Other Acts Provided by Law are to be Done. 
The County cited to two examples in its response brief before the District Court to 
support its contention that the first day was included and counted in computing the at-issue 
statutory deadline. The County first argued that the Idaho Tort Claims Act and Idaho Code § 6-
906 did not skip the first day in calculating when the 180 day claim period expired. (Clerk's 
2 As well as Idaho Code § 31-3505(2)-the first day emergency medical services are 
provided would be excluded. 
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Record on Appeal (hereinafter "Clr. R.'") at 40.) The County also relied upon a case, Seawell v. 
Gifford, 22 Idaho 295, 125 P.2d 182 (1912), to support its argument that Idaho Code § 73-109 
did not apply in the present matter. (Clr. R. at 41.) The problem for the County, however, was 
that neither example supported its arguments, and in fact, only supported the position of Saint 
Alphonsus, which is likely why the two examples were not used again by the County on appeal 
to this Court. 
1. The 180 Day Claim Period under Idaho Code § 6-906 is Computed in the 
Same Manner that Saint Alphonsus has Done with Idaho Code § 31-
3505(3 ). 
In relation to the Idaho Tort Claims Act example, the County had 
its brief: 
the following in 
"Idaho Code section 6-906 provid[ es] claims 'shall be presented to and filed 
the clerk or secretary of the political subdivision within one hundred eighty (180) 
days from the date the claim arose ... ". The legislature sets limits, they are 
supposed to be clear to all, and if you miss the time limit, you miss your 
opportunity to bring the case, no matter how worthy it might be. 
(Cir. R. at 40.) In lvfitchell v. Bingham 1Uemorial Hospital, 130 Idaho 420, 422-26, 942 P.2d 
544, 546-550 (1997), this Court upheld the district court's granting of a motion to dismiss the 
case for failure to file a timely notice of tort claim. (Id.) This Court held that the 180-day notice 
period began to run on July 20, 1992 and that the last day on which the plaintiff could have filed 
a timely notice of tort claim was January 16, 1993. Id. at 424, 942 P.2d at 548. If this Court had 
used the time computation urged by the County (i.e. including the first day), then the last day on 
which plaintiff could have filed a timely notice of tort claim would have been January 15, 1993. 
This Court, however, did not employ 
time computation as Saint Alphonsus 
time computation. It instead employed the very same 
instant matter by excluding the 
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1992),3 which is the same time computation it used in IHC Hospitals, Inc. v. Teton County, 139 
Idaho 188, 75 P.3d 1198, n. 2 (2003) and St. Alphonsus Reg'l lvfed'l Ctr., Lui v. Canyon County, 
120 Idaho 420, 816 P.2d 977 (1991). These computations all follow 
Idaho Code§ 73-109. 
mandate set forth in 
2. Oliason Demonstrates that the Filing of an Application under Idaho Code 
§ 31-3505(3) is an Act "provided by law" and therefore Governed by 
Idaho Code § 73-109. 
Oliason v. Girard, 57 Idaho 41, _, 61 P.2d 288, 289-90 (1936) discusses when an act is 
"provided by law" under Idaho Code § 73-1 This case overruled Seawell. 61 P .2d at 291. 
The facts in Oliason were as follows. On September 24, 1936, members the Union Party 
to the Idaho secretary of state for a general 
election to be held on November 3, 1936. 57 Idaho at 61 P.2d at secretary of the 
state to file the certificate on the ground that it was tendered one day too late under the 
provisions of then Idaho Code § 33-644, which required such certificates to be filed "not more 
than sixty days and not less than forty days before the ensuing election." Id. The issue 
before this Court was postured as follows: "Does the statute, (section 33-644) providing that a 
nomination certificate must be filed 'not less than forty days before election," require forty days 
to intervene between the date of filing and election day; or may the day filing be counted as 
one of the forty days." Id. at 288-89. 
This Court noted there ,vere two lines of authority in construing a similar statute, and 
specifically identified Seawell for holding that both days must be excluded and the full number 
of "clear days" must intervene. Id. at 289. In Seawell, the at-issue statute required a nomination 
3 Both Idaho Code § 6-906 and Idaho Code § 31-3505(3) use the same language and 
structure. Whereas § 6-906 uses "filed ... within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date 
the claim arose ... ", section 31-3505(3) uses "filed ... within thirty-one (31) days of the date of 
admission." 
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paper to be filed "at least thirty days, and not more than sixty days, prior to the primary." Id 
The primary in Seawell was set for July 30 and the nomination paper was not filed until July 1, 
which left only twenty-eight intervening days between the date of offering the certificate for 
filing and the date of election. Id In order for it to be considered timely, it would have been 
necessary to count date of filing and date of election, but this would not have been at least 
thirty days prior to the primary and it also would not have been in time if the first day was 
excluded under Idaho Code § 70-109. Id By contrast, in Oliason, this Court noted that the offer 
for filing on September 24th and the November 3rd election would leave thirty-nine days between 
the date the offer of filing and election. Id. If the day on which the certificate was presented 
for filing was counted, it was exactly forty days before the election. Id. 
The analysis turned to Code § 70-109. The Idaho Supreme Court noted that 
the statute at issue in Seawell required that the certificate be filed at thirty days prior to the 
primary" and that the Seawell Court found that applying section 70-109 to allow the certificate to 
be filed 29 or 28 days prior would be a clear disregard of the statute. Id. The Idaho Supreme 
Court then examined the interplay between section 70-109 and Idaho Code§ 33-644: 
It is true that the statute there under consideration, as well as the one before us 
now, "does not fix the day" when *290 the certificate shall be filed. However, it 
does "provide by law" for doing the act of filing a certificate and likevvise 
provides the method of determining the time at which the act shall be performed, 
by declaring that it "shall be filed *** not less than forty days before the ensuing 
general election." It is, therefore, clear to us that the rule for computation of time, 
as specified by section 70-109, LC.A., is applicable in determining the maximum 
and minimum time within which the filing may be made under the nomination 
statute. Section 33-644. 
Id. at 289-90. The Idaho Supreme Court then followed the ... ~ ... ~~·- of section 70-109 for 
determining the limits for when the certificate could be filed under section 33-644. Id. at 289. It 
excluded the first day ( election included the last day and that certificate was 
tendered on the fonieth before election day, which was timely. Id. Since issuance 
11 
Oliason, the Idaho Supreme Court has continued to recognize the validity of applying section 70-
109 to statutes specifying acts provided by law. See Harris v. Beco Corp., 110 Idaho 28, 29-30, 
713 P.2d 1387, 1388-89 (1986)("In determining time computation, the general rule is that the 
first day is excluded and the last day is included. See, e.g., Idaho Code§ 73-109; Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 6(a)4"); Cather v. Kelso, 103 Idaho 685, 688, 652 P.2d 188, 192 (1982).) 
Oliason 's reasoning and holding is instructive on the facts at hand. As noted in Oliason, 
the statute there and in Seawell did not fix the day when the certificate should be provided; 
however, it did "provide by law" for doing the act of filing a certificate and it likewise provided 
method for determining the time at 
Code § 31-3505(3) operates the same way: 
the act should be performed. Id. at 289-90. Idaho 
the case of hospitalization, a completed application for emergency 
necessary medical services shall filed with the department any time within 
thirty-one (31) days of the date of admission. 
Id. Section 3505(3) does not fix the day when an application should be filed; however, it does 
"provide by law" for doing the act of filing an application for emergency necessary medical 
services with the department and it likewise provides the method for determining the time at 
which the act should be performed. The next step is to apply the mandate of section 73-109 as 
the Idaho Supreme Court did in Oliason. Applying the mandate results in the thirty-first day 
from admission being August 27, 2013, which is the same date the Application was filed. 
Accordingly, the Application was timely filed under section 31-3505(3). 
4 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) mirrors the language of Idaho Code§§ 73-108, -109 
& -110: "In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by order of court, 
or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default after which the designated period 
of time begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be 
included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until 
the'end of the next day which is neither a Saturday, a Sunday nor a holiday." 
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D. The Board's Ambiguity Arguments Do not Change the Fact that the 
County's Interpretation is Contrary to Existing Idaho Supreme Court 
Precedent that Computes when Statutory Acts are to be Done. 
While the County did not make any arguments relating to ambiguity at the appeal hearing 
in front of the Board or at the appeal to the District Court, it does so now on appeal. The 
arguments are unavailing. 
1. The Legislative History Arguments Made by the County Do Not 
Reference Any Authority for Calculating Deadlines in the Manner it 
Argues on Appeal. 
The County's arguments relating to the history of Idaho Code §§ 31-3504 and -3505 
continue to miss the mark, because they provide no authority as to how the deadlines are to be 
computed. Saint Alphonsus identified case law construing how deadlines were to be computed 
when submitting an application for county assistance under prior statutory revisions to Idaho 
Code §§ 31-3504 and -3505. See infra, St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med'! Ctr., Ltd v. Canyon County, 
120 420,816 P.2d 977 (1991) abrogated on other grounds by Univ. of Utah Hosp. v. Twin 
Falls County, 122 Idaho 1010, 842 P.2d 689 (1992); Univ. of Utah Hosp. v. Pence, 104 Idaho 
172, 657 P.2d 469 (1983). These cases do not support the County's arguments under the 
"legislative history" to either statute to Idaho Code§§ 31-3504 and -3505. Again, if anything, 
the only case cited by the County, Univ. of Utah Hosp. on Behalf of Scarberry v. Bd. of Cnt. 
Comm 'rs, 116 Idaho 434, 436, 776 P.2d 443, 445 (1989) supports the position of Saint 
Alphonsus. The County notes that at the time Scarberry was decided, the application for 
benefits vvas due vvithin forty-five days following admission to the hospital or within thirty days 
of the time the individual became medically indigent. (Appellant's Brief, p. 13.) As noted 
above, St. Alphonsus Reg'! 1vfed'l Lrd v. Canyon County, 120 Idaho 420, 816 P.2d 977 
( 1991) addressed the statute submission of an application within thirty days of when 
the patient becomes medically This Court computed the "within thirty days of 
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becoming medically indigent" as Saint Alphonsus consistently has done throughout this entire 
proceeding, which was to exclude the first day. Accordingly, the arguments made by the County 
are unpersuasive, because they are not supported by decisions made by this Court that actually 
considered computation of time under the Code. 
2. The County's Reference to Other Provisions within the Code Do Not 
Illustrate How to Compute Deadlines under the Code. 
The County's arguments relating to "other provisions of the Medical Indigency Act" 
make little sense in light of its Final Determination. In its Final Determination of Denial, the 
County erroneously construed and applied both Idaho Code§ 31-3505(2) and -3505(3) together: 
2. The Board concludes, as a matter of law that both Idaho Code section 
31-3505(2) and 31-3505(3) clearly and unambiguously require a filed application 
within 31 davs of emergency care or hospitalization. This patient began 
emergency care and was hospitalized the same day; therefore, both subsections 
(2), "beginning with the first day of the provision of necessary medical services 
from the provider" and (3 ), "within thirty-one (31) days of the date of admission" 
apply and both subsections of the statute require a "complete application .... 
filed ... within thirty-one (31) days." In addition, because both subsections (2) 
and (3) apply, there is no ambiguity as to when the count begins. 
(Ag. R. Ex. 1 at 37.) The arguments raised by the County on appeal seemingly ignore its own 
previous convoluted findings relating to Idaho Code § 31-3505(2) and -3505(3), vvhich construed 
the two together. Those two subsections state as follows: 
(2) A completed application for emergency necessary medical services shall be 
filed with the clerk any time within thirty-one (31) days beginning with the first 
day of the provision of necessary medical services from the provider, except as 
provided in subsection (3) of this section. 
(3) In the case of hospitalization, a completed application for emergency 
necessary medical services shall be filed with the department any time within 
thirty-one (31) days of the date of admission. 
Idaho Code § 31-3505(2),(3)( emphasis added). Subsection applies only when there is no 
When a patient is hospitalized, subsection (3) applies and (2) has no 
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bearing on the matter. This is made amply clear by the inclusion of "except as provided in 
subsection (3) of this section". To hold otherwise with the County's interpretation is to presume 
that the legislature performed an idle act by enacting a meaningless provision, which is a method 
of statutory construction that is not condoned. See, e.g., Brown v. Caldwell School Dist., 127 
Idaho 112, 117 898 P.2d 43, 48 (1995)("A statute should be construed so that effect is given to 
all its provisions, so that no part will be rendered superfluous or insignificant. Further, we do not 
presume that the legislature performed an idle act by enacting a meaningless 
provision.")( citations omitted) 
There is no dispute that the Patient vvas hospitalized and therefore Idaho Code § 31-
3505(3) applies and not Idaho Code § 31-3505(2). For whatever reason, the County applied the 
"beginning with the first day of the provision necessary medical services" to Idaho Code § 31-
3505(3) when that language is nowhere found in the section and runs completely counter to the 
"except as provided in subsection (3) of section" language to Idaho Code § 31-3505(2). In 
so doing, the County overlooked the plain language ofidaho Code § 31-3505(3) and erroneously 
construed the two statutes together. It should not have done so and instead should have relied 
only on Idaho Code§ 31-3505(3). 
In any event, as noted above, there is no inherent conflict as to the deadlines within § 31-
3505(2) and § 31-3505(3) as the County seemingly argues. As made clear by all of the cases 
above, in order for a deadline to start, it needs a starting point. The starting point for Idaho Code 
§ 31-3505(2) is when emergency services are first provided not when begins or 
ends, or when emergency services cease. Similarly, for services requiring hospitalization, the 
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beginning date is admission not discharge. Accordingly, the County's argument on this issue is 
simply argument and without any legal support. 5 
3. The Other Areas of Law Examples Cited by the County Fail to Support 
the County's Computation of Time Arguments. 
The County's own logic and reasoning undercuts the examples it uses in referencing 
other areas of the law. As it relates to child protection proceedings, the County notes that a 
Court must hold a hearing within forty-eight hours of emergency removal of the child from his 
parents' home. Forty-eight hours is two days. Under Saint Alphonsus's reasoning, the second 
day would be Wednesday and not Thursday as the County argues. (See Appellant's Brief, p. 15.) 
As it relates to involuntary commitment proceedings, the County unconvincingly argues that a 
hearing must be held within five days of for commitment, which includes the first 
day; however, the County still fails to offer any case law or authority for computing acts of law, 
especially in relation to matters under 66, Chapter 3, Idaho Code. Finally, and most 
interesting, the County cites a specific statute detailing how to compute the term of 
imprisonment. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 15-1 There is no deadline in Idaho Code§ 18-309 and 
the County has not demonstrated how this provision is an act "provided by lavv" similar to the 
filing of an application for county assistance, so its relation to this matter is tangential, at best.6 
Nevertheless, it is a specific statute for computing time for terms of imprisonment, vvhich is 
wholly lacking in the Code. In other words, the Code does not have a specific statute for 
5 Similarly, Idaho Code § 31-3505A concerns the investigatory duties of the clerk. While 
it contains deadlines that the clerk must meet, it has no bearing on how deadlines are to be 
computed under the Code. Again, the County fails to perceive that determining how to compute 
deadlines is the key issue and not that deadlines exist or must be strictly enforced. 
6 The same may be said for the County's arguments relating to recording interests in real 
property, water law, or mechanic's liens, which arguments were also not raised below but are 
now on appeal. (See Cir. R. at 40-41.) 
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computing acts under the Code. Accordingly, this only goes to show that Idaho Code § 73-109 
is applicable to the deadlines set forth in the Code. 
4. Whether the Legislature Imposed Strict Deadlines that were to Be Strictly 
Enforced is Irrelevant to the Issue at Hand, Namely, How Acts Provided 
under the Code Are to Be Computed. 
Whether or not the Code imposes strict time limits that are to be strictly enforced is 
irrelevant to the issue before this Court. (See Appellant's Brief, § IV.C.2.) The issue is whether 
the Application was timely filed within thirty-one days of admission and not whether the Court 
should grant leniency in enforcing the Code's time limits. In order to make this determination, 
this involves determining the appropriate methodology for computing the contemplated 
deadlines, something the County has failed to do throughout this case. The cases cited by the 
County in Section IV.C.2 of their Brief simply do not support its position on this argument: 
rather, they only support the position of Saint Alphonsus. Accordingly, whether the Code 
imposes strict time limits is irrelevant to the sole issue at hand, because the Application was 
timely filed. 
The County cites to Bonner County v. Cunningham, 156 Idaho 291, 323 P.3d 1252 
(2014) for support of its argument that "Idaho courts have also confirmed the importance of 
adhering to the strict deadlines established in statutes of limitations in general." (Appellant's 
Brief p. 18.) The County simply misses the mark in its discussion of the case, because it 
completely overlooks how the Idaho Court of Appeals calculated the deadline \Vithin the at-issue 
statute, Idaho Code§ 37-2744(c), which provided as follows: 
( c) In the event of seizure pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, proceedings 
under subseaion ( d) of this section shall be instituted promptly. 
( 1) \\'ben property is seized under this section, the director or the peace 
officer who seized the property may: 
(A) Place the property under seal; 
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(B) Remove the property to a place designated by it; or 
(C) Take custody of the property and remove it to an appropriate 
location for disposition in accordance with law. 
(2) The peace officer who seized the property shall within five (5) days 
notify the director of such seizure. 
(3) In the event of seizure pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, 
proceedings under subsection (d) of this section shall be instituted within 
(30) days by the director or appropriate prosecuting attorney. 
Id. at 323 P.3d at 1255 (emphasis in original). The relevant facts as determined by the Idaho 
Court of Appeals were as follows: "Here, the cash was seized from Cunningham's home on 
March 30, 1 L and the County's complaint seeking civil forfeiture of that cash was filed on 
The statute in Cunningham identifies a starting point (seizure) and uses the same "within" 
language as of Idaho Code § 31-3505(3). If the Idaho Court of Appeals had used the same 
logic and reasoning navv argued by the County, then the thirty-fourth day would have been May 
2, 2011. Hov,;ever, it did not use such logic or reasoning and instead employed the very same 
approach that 
the deadline. 
Alphonsus has used, which is to exclude the first day in the computation of 
The County has continually failed to appreciate or mention the computation of deadlines 
in cases or examples that it cites. It has been aware of this Court's computation of time under the 
Code before even the appeal hearing in front of the Board. This is because IHC Hospitals, Inc. v. 
Teton County, 139 Idaho 188, 75 P.3d 1198 (2003) was specifically referenced and quoted in 
correspondence by Board's counsel on November 4, 2013. (Ag. R. 1 at 30-32.) The 
correspondence contained a block quote omitted the sentence containing Footnote 2, which 
clearly delineates how deadlines under the Code are to be computed. (Ag. R. 1 at 32.) IHC 's 
computation time under the Code was specifically pointed out at the appeal hearing before the 
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Board. (Agency Transcript, Ex. 2 at 7:15-8:20.) The County indeed admitted that this Court 
omitted the first day computing the deadline, but made the following argument: 
I don't think that's all that the legislature meant. They meant you have within 
thirty-one days from either one of those two events to file your application. I 
think the difference between the fact and the law here, Mr. Berry referred to § 3 l -
3505D, which is strictly a procedural provision of the law that talks about filing 
an appeal. The Court did count the days, skipping the first day to determine when 
a notice of appeal was due. But I think the difference is Mr. White incurred 
injuries, was air lifted and admitted all on the same day. 
(Agency Transcript, 2 at 12:20-13:5.) No authority or argument was made by the County in 
its Response Brief to the District Court and there is no authority or argument now on appeal to 
this Court to support its perceived distinction between section 3505(3) and 3505D's deadlines. 
"When issues on appeal are not supported by positions of law, authority, or argument, they will 
not be considered." Frogley v. Aferidian Joint School Dist. No. 2, 15 Idaho 558, _, 314 P.3d 
613, 619-20 (2013 ). In any event, as demonstrated by Oliason, this is because there is no 
distinction. section 3505(3) and 3505D are acts "provided by law" and they are computed 
in the same way, which is to exclude the first day in the computation of time. 
5. Under clear Idaho Precedent, Saint Alphonsus filed a Timely Application 
under Idaho Code § 31-3505(3) and the County's Position is Simply 
Unreasonable and Completely Contrary to Idaho Statute and Precedent. 
The County did not cite a case to support its proposition that statutes should be construed 
on a reasonableness standard. (See Appellant's Brief, § IV.C.3.) Nevertheless, Saint Alphonsus 
submits that the County's position is not only unreasonable but completely contrary to Idaho 
statute and precedent. The County has never once cited to any authority that mentions or 
discusses the computation of deadlines set forth in the Code in the manner it novv argues. It has 
instead relied upon examples, such as hunting before the Board and District Court, although 
failed to identify specific or statute to support its example. It has relied upon the Idaho 
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Tort Claims Act both in briefing as well as at the Board's appeal hearing (Agency Transcript, Ex. 
2 at 19:8-20:1 to argue that the 180-day limitation is computed in the same manner as it 
contends section 3505(3)'s thirty-one day deadline is to be computed. However, this Court's 
computation of the 180-day limitation under the Idaho Tort Claims Act runs squarely counter to 
the County's contention. The County has relied upon a case, Seawell, which was overruled by 
Oliason. The logic and reasoning of Oliason clearly fail to support the County's contentions in 
this case and only support Saint Alphonsus's position. The County has failed to address or rebut 
Saint Alphonsus's argument that it was a timely filed Application under the reasoning of JHC 
Hospitals, Inc. v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 188, 75 P.3d 1198 (2003) and St. Alphonsus Reg'! 
lvfed'l Ctr., Ltdv. Canyon County, 120 Idaho 420,816 P.2d 977 (1991). It even cited to a case at 
the appeal hearing before the District Court, Univ. of Utah Hosp. v. Pence, I Idaho 172, 657 
P.2d 469 (1983), which computed deadlines under the Code as Saint Alphonsus has done. Even 
now, on appeal to this Court, the County continues to cite cases Bonner County v. 
Cunningham, 156 Idaho 291, 323 P.3d 1252 (2014)) that do not support its arguments, but only 
bolster those of Saint Alphonsus. By all accounts, Saint Alphonsus·s interpretation is more than 
reasonable. Under clear Idaho precedent, Saint Alphonsus filed a timely Application under 
Idaho Code§ 31-3505(3). 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner-Respondent respectfully requests that the District 
Court's determination reversing the Board's decision be UPHELD and the matter be 
further investigation by the County in accordance with its statutory duties 
under Title 31, Chapter 35, Idaho Code. 
II 
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